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NOTES
UNION INROADS UPON MANAGEMENT THROUGH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Introduction
In Matter of Richfield Oil Corp.,' the National Labor Relations
Board recently held that an employee stock purchase plan is a proper
subject of compulsory collective bargaining. This decision has pointed
up a factor that is effectively changing labor relations and our society.
It is the culmination of a long series of cases evincing a trend on the
part of the Board to give labor a stronger voice in management. It
demonstrates how the Labor Management Relations Act 2 is employed
to give unions a greater degree of control in managerial decisions and
it provides the labor movement with an effective device for securing
many concessions.
Following the failure of the National Industrial Recovery Act,3
which gave employees the right-to organize and bargain collectively
through their chosen representatives, Congress passed the Wagner
Act, which is now the Labor Management Relations Act.4 The basis
for such legislation is congressional authority in the area of interstate
commerce.5 In so legislating, Congress sought to eliminate certain
causes of industrial strife and unrest which constituted a substantial
impediment to the free flow of commerce. "Experience has proved
that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bar-
gain collectively safeguards commerce from injury . .." 6 It is im-
portant to note that the purpose and policy of the Act is ". . . to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers..."
and ".... to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing
the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other. . 7
15 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (4th ed.) 1[ 52,345 (NLRB 1954).
261 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1952) (Taft-Hartley Act).
3 The unconstitutionality of this Act was determined by the Supreme Court
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
449 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
188 (1952).
5 U.S. CocsT. Art. I, § 8. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6161 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952) (findings and policy).
761 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952) (declaration of purpose
and policy) (emphasis added).
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The Duty to Bargain Collectively
The terms of the Act provide that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with his employees.8
Conversely, it is an unfair labor practice for employees, through their
properly certified labor organization or its agents, to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer.9
To carry out the terms and purpose of the Act, Congress cre-
ated the National Labor Relations Board.'0 When deciding what
subjects are within the ambit of collective bargaining, the Board
looks solely to those standards set forth in Section 9(a). This sec-
tion requires collective bargaining as to all matters included in the
terms ". . . rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment. . ... 11i The Act further provides that:
". .. to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obli-
gation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotia-
tion of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ...." 12
Where there is a bargainable subject, the employer is compelled
to confer in "good faith" as to that issue. If he does not do so, he
may be adjudged guilty of an unfair labor practice. While this re-
quirement does not, strictly speaking, compel the employer and em-
ployees to reach an agreement,1 3 the employer does not discharge his
duty to bargain collectively in good faith by merely meeting with the
representatives of his employees and listening patiently while pretend-
ing a "semblance of an endeavor to reach a mutual understanding." 14
The Act requires something of a more affirmative nature. As was
stated in Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,15 "[i]t [the Act] has placed
upon the employer the duty . . . to enter into discussion with its
employees with open and fair minds, with sincere purpose to find
basis for agreement." '( Such collective bargaining imposes a duty
8 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1952).
961 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952).
1049 STAT. 451 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1952).
1161 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952).
1261 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
is Ibid.
14 Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 595 (1941).
15 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
16Id. at 134. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 39, 52-55 (1936).
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to make reasonable efforts to adjust or regulate differences.17 In the
Singer case the court held that while the Act could not compel an
employer to agree with the employees, the court may, in determining
whether an employer had bargained in good faith, find his dealings
to be a sham or pretense.' 8 The result is that the employer must
meet the proposals of the union with manifestly reasonable counter-
proposals or objections or be adjudged guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice. In this respect, the duty to bargain almost becomes the duty
to make compromises and concessions.'
The obligation does not stop merely at an honest attempt to
arrive at an agreement-more is required. Thus, at times, there is
a refusal to bargain collectively when the employer declines to con-
tribute certain information and data deemed useful to a resolution of
the issue.20 This is true although such information is confidential 21
and its divulgence might possibly, in those enterprises where com-
petition is more than nominal, damage the employer's competitive
position.2 This is not expressly demanded by the Act, but rather,
is implied from the duty to bargain in good faith.23
17 See NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952); cf.
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937).
18 "The statute requires of the employer that he bargain collectively and
whether he does so depends upon the character of his acts of commission or
omission. Collective bargaining is an act; pretended collective bargaining is
an omission to perform the act, and no unusual difficulty arises because, in
determining whether bargaining within the meaning of the Act has indeed
occurred, the trier of the facts must determine whether the acts proved were
rendered in good faith or were merely in pretended good faith and performed
with the actual intent to achieve the very opposite of collective bargaining.
Existence or nonexistence of good faith, just as existence and nonexistence of
intent, involve only inquiry as to fact. Whether a crime has been committed
not infrequently depends upon existence or nonexistence of a felonious intent.
Whether one is a bona fide purchaser for value of negotiable paper before
maturity without notice puts in issue questions of fact. The neutrality re-
quired of an employer in his transactions with his employees is another in-
tangible product of fact, the existence or nonexistence of which usually de-
pends upon the character of acts committed or omitted. The civil law furnishes
repeated instances of application of the principle." Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
supra note 14 at 133-134.
19 See 16 U. OF CHI. L. RFv. 568, 569 (1949).
20 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject see Sherman, Employer's
Obligation to Produce Data For Collective Bargaining, 35 MINN. L. REV. 24
(1950); Note, 3 STAN. L. REv. 88 (1950).
22 See Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F,2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
22 This objection was raised repeatedly by witnesses at the 1953 Congressional
Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act. See, e.g.,
Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor of tire House of
Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 606-607, 1395, 1418-1419, 2209-2210, 2394-
2395, 3702 (1953).
23 See Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, supra note 21; Note, 3 STAN. L. REv.
88 (1950).
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The Problem Presented
The Act states that the legitimate rights of both the employer
and the employee must be recognized. Labor has the right to make
the employer submit to collective bargaining over wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment. Management has
thereby lost its exclusive power over these subjects. To the degree
that the Board has decided a matter to be a bargainable subject with-
in the terms of the Act, management has suffered a limitation on its
unilateral decision-making powers, and the bargainable area thereby
becomes the joint responsibility of labor and management. The par-
ticular problem is to what extent the Board may go-when deciding
what matters are included within the statutory scope of bargaining
under the Act-without infringing upon the exclusive prerogatives
of management. This problem is magnified by the fact that there is
not even a proper definition of the scope of management. 24
A variety of subjects are brought within the terms of the Act.
Paid holidays, vacations and bonuses are an integral part of the earn-
ings and working conditions of the employees and, as such, are proper
subjects of collective bargaining.25 Again, although no formal bonus
plan was in existence, an employer has been compelled to bargain
over a Christmas bonus. Because the bonus had been regularly paid
for a substantial number of years, the court held that it assumed the
status of "wages." 26 The installation of an incentive pay plan is also
properly subject to collective bargaining.27 Likewise, employers are
compelled to bargain with the representatives of their employees as
to individual merit wage increases based on the individual's per-
formance. 28 Labeling of such an increase as gratuitous does not obvi-
ate the fact that it does effectuate changes in rates of pay and wages. 29
A profit-sharing retirement plan is also within the area of bargaining
contemplated by the Act.80
In Inland Steel Co.,8 1 it was held that an optional pension and
retirement plan, to Which the employer contributed, constituted wages;
24 See Feldman, The Right to Manage, 1 LABOR L.J. 287 (1950).
25 See Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 595 (1941) (The employer claimed it had pursued a practice in re-
spect to these subjects since 1936 and expected to continue the same at its own
discretion. It asserted that these subjects involved voluntary gratuities, the
allowance or disallowance of which was to be determined solely by the
employer.).
26 Century Cement Mfg. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1952); see NLRB v.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
27 John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.RB. 989 (1950).
28 NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 814 (1948).
29 Ibid.
30 NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954).
8177 N.L.R.B. 1, enforcement granted, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
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hence it was bargainable. There the statutory definition of "wages"
was broadly 3 2 construed to include not only remuneration received
by an employee for actual performance of work, but such other
".. . emoluments of value . . . which may accrue to employees out
of their employment relationship." 33 Applying this rule, a long es-
tablished policy of granting ten shares of stock to employees has been
termed an appropriate subject of bargaining.3 4 Similarly, the price
of company-furnished meals 3 5 and, at times, the amount of rent paid
on company houses 3 6 also come within the purview of the Act. The
Inland Steel definition has been extended, in W. W. Cross & Co. v.
NLRBJ1 to cover group health and accident insurance plans. The
court, in that case, defined "wages" by saying that ".... it must have
been meant to comprehend emoluments resulting from employment
in addition to or supplementary to actual 'rates of pay.' "38
The Board's decision in Richfield Oil Corp.3 9 followed this line of
reasoning. The employer had unilaterally installed a voluntary stock
purchase plan whereby employees who wished to participate could
deposit a minimum of $5 or up to 5% of their salary therein. This
fund is matched in part by the employer and the total is invested in
stock of the employer, which stock is held in trust subject to the
voting direction of the employee. The Board held the plan to be
encompassed by the statutory terms "wages and other conditions of
employment" and cited the Inland Steel rule as controlling.40 Al-
though the stock purchase plan involved was ostensibly includable in
the term "wages" as broadly interpreted by the Inland Steel rule,
there are other factors involved in the nature of the plan which may
32 See Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949), wherein the
Board took advantage of the fact that the definition of the term "wages" was
broadly construed in Inland Steel Co.
33 Inland Steel Co., supra note 31 at 4. See W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B.
1162 (1948), enforcement granted, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
34 See United Shoe Machinery Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1314 (1951).
35 Such meals come within the terms "conditions of employment" and
"wages" where the employees had no public or employer-furnished means of
transportation to public eating facilities. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., mpra
note 32.
36 See NLRB v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33, 37 (5th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964, 972 (4th Cir. 1951).
3 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
38 W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, mspra note 37 at 878 (emphasis added).
The court attempted to further define the area by saying: "This does not
necessarily mean that the word 'wages' as used in the Act covers all satisfac-
tions, pleasures or gratifications arising from employment such as playing on
a company baseball team, or attending a company picnic, or belonging to a
company social club, although perhaps under some peculiar circumstances of
employment in an isolated plant it might." Ibid. (emphasis added).
39 5 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (4th ed.) 52,345 (NLRB 1954).
40 The majority stated: "It is now well established that the term 'wages'
comprehends all emoluments of value which may accrue to employees because
of their employment relationship. In our opinion, a stock purchase plan" of
the character before us is embraced by this statutory term." Id. at p. 51,771.
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make its inclusion an unwarranted extension of that rule. A dis-
tinctive consideration is the fact that the employer may thereby have
to bargain collectively over the very ownership of the company.41
Board Member Beeson, in dissenting, maintained that the effect of
the Board's decision constituted an interference with the "legitimate
rights" Congress intended to protect in Section 1 of the Act. He
reasoned that ". . . since an employer does not have to bargain with
respect to supervisors, the determination of the very ownership of the
company, involved in a stock purchase plan, could not be included
in the required bargaining area without violating the intent of Con-
gress. .... , 42 The majority obviously recognized such a consid-
eration to be a factor which would remove the subject from the area
of required collective bargaining, leaving it solely within the province
of management, when it noted that "[i]t by no means follows that
the effect of our decision here is to require the Respondent to bargain
with respect to its dividend, debt, and financial policies, simply be-
cause, as the dissenting opinion would have it, such matters are
'relevant' to the establishment of a stock purchase plan." 4 The
Board thereby guarantees that bargaining collectively over such plans
will not involve matters of ownership. In giving such an assurance,
the Board relies on a rather tenuous analogy to unrelated subjects
when it says "[i] ndeed, these factors are no less relevant where a
union seeks to bargain about higher wages, pension plans, or profit
sharing plans, all of which have been held by this Board and by the
Courts to be subjects of mandatory collective bargaining. Yet no
one can seriously contend that those decisions have forced employers
to bargain as to their dividend, debt, or financial policies." 44 Thus,
the result is that the Board recognizes that ownership is not within
the terms of the Act and further, it concludes that the result of this
decision will not compel bargaining over any of the ownership matters.
This conclusion is, however, based on the premise that such bargain-
ing has not occurred in other areas, i.e., higher wages, pension plans,
41 ". ... [T]he Inland Steel case cannot be controlling because the present
case presents a question which was not there involved and upon which neither
this Board nor any court has ever passed. We refer to the question whether
an employer is required to bargain over the ownership and control of his
business. To hold that a corporate employer is required to bargain over the
terms upon which employees may acquire and hold stock in the corporation
would be to give an unequivocal affirmative answer to that question. To so
hold would mean that a corporate employer such as Richfield must bargain
regarding the number of shares to be acquired, their price, the method and
time of payment of the price, the voting and other rights to be attached to the
shares, the manner of exercise of those rights, and all of the other incidents
of stock acquisition and ownership." Supplemental Brief for Respondent,
pp. 6-7, Richfield Oil Corp., supra note 39.
42 Richfield Oil Corp., supra note 39 at p. 51,774 (emphasis added).
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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and profit sharing plans-areas to which ownership is manifestly
unrelated.
Considering again, for purposes of distinction, the nature of the
plan, it would seem that there is a real difference 45 between the statu-
tory term of "wages" as construed in previous decisions and the con-
struction of that term in the Richfield decision. In that case the cir-
cumstances are essentially characterized by a privileged invitation to
invest in the corporation's shares 46 rather than as an "emolument of
value" earned by reason of the employment relationship.47 Further-
more, the result of the decision is inequitable because, through stock
ownership, labor now will be on both sides of the bargaining table.
Where such worker-ownership is substantial, the Board has excluded
employees from the bargaining table.48
Labor in Management
The foregoing cases demonstrate that the Board has taken a very
broad view of what is comprehended by the terms "wages, rates of
pay or other conditions of employment." Without statutory delinea-
tion of this area, the terms of the Act can be expanded to include
anything that might indirectly and ultimately affect the employee.49
It would seem that there is no limit to what may be included in the
statutory terms. Management may lose all of its exclusive rights.50
This is irreconcilable with the fact that the courts and the Act recog-
nize that there are certain rights of management which cannot be
infringed upon.51
45 The majority in the Richfield Oil Corp. decision, in holding that the bene-
fits accruing to employees under the plan represent part of their compensation
or remuneration received for their labor, said, ". . . we reject as totally un-
realistic both Member Beeson's suggestion that the Plan is merely designed to
encourage employees to become co-entrepreneurs and the Respondent's position
... that its contributions are in no way related to compensation but represent
merely an incentive to employees to invest in company stock, the sole consid-
eration therefor being the contributions made by the participating employees."
5 CCH LAB. LAw REP. (4th ed.) 152,345, pp. 51,771-51,772 (NLRB 1954).
46 It is privileged in the sense that it is open to employees of Richfield only
and, because of Richfield's contribution, is tantamount to an offering of shares
by the employer at reduced rates.
47 See note 33 supra.
48 Union Furniture Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1946) ; see 41 VA. L. Rxv. 259
(1955).
49 See Woods, Mandatory Collective Bargaining, 6 HASINGs L.J. 1, 5
(1954) (testimony of Charles E. Wilson before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare in 1947).
50 See Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 27, enforcement granted, 170 F.2d
247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949), wherein the Board in-
dicates that unions are now consulted on many matters which were formerly
within the exclusive rights of management.
51 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co., supra note 50. "It is conceivable that the de-
mands of employees may sometimes fall completely dehors the limits of em-
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At the same time, labor is participating in management to a
greater and greater degree. While it is beneficial for an employer to
have aid from his employees in some matters of management,5 2 it is
not desirable that there be worker participation in all phases of di-
rection, administration and execution. For labor to share in all phases
of management may be ideal theoretically, but it is impractical. Such
a goal overlooks the economic nature of the employer-employee rela-
tionship. It presumes that labor is qualified to handle such a job.5
Further, such participation presumes that the union will assume re-
sponsibility to the owners of industry.54 "Such a division of loyalties
is possible, perhaps, only in a Utopian system of industrial democracy
and calls for a degree of labor-management statesmanship which thus
far has not been evident." r5 Unions cannot properly share or par-
ticipate in management; for until they have full control of the enter-
prise, they are impelled in their desires by that which is their primary
concern-the interest of their members.
Management, to protect its rights, has taken a positive approach
which is becoming more and more commonplace. There is included
a valid "management rights" clause in over 60% of the collective
bargaining agreements negotiated today.56 By this device, it is pos-
sible-notwithstanding the obligations of the Act as determined by
the Board-to clearly define the scope of managerial action which is
to remain solely in the employer's discretion.57
Conclusion
The effect of the Richfield and related decisions is to discourage
voluntary amelioration of the employee's. status by the employer in
modes of compensation other than traditionally earned wages. For
once the employer institutes a plan, it becomes bargainable and the
union will probably try to increase the benefits. 58 Because of this,
ployee interest. The Act does not seek to encroach on those prerogatives of
the employer which give him a free hand to prosecute his business as he sees
fit. . . . Our system of free enterprise must necessarily protect the employer
in enjoying what is commonly termed his 'management prerogatives." Id. at
26-27.
52 See Feldman, The Right to Manage, 1 LABoR L.J. 287, 291 (1950).
53 Id. at 289. .54Ibid. See Burstein, The Statia of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
2 LABOR L.J. 902, 907 (1951).
55 Burstein, supra note 54.
56 See BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING CONTRACTS 39 (Rev. ed. 1950). As to the legality of such a
clause, see NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
57 See NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., supra note 56.
58 See GUNTERT, ANALYSIS OF THE RECORD OF THE 1953 CONGRESSIONAL
HEARINGS ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT. In dis-
cussing the Inland Steel case and the Richfield Oil situation, the author states:
"The result of this situation is that employers who have traditionally kept pace
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management will hesitate to offer employee benefits in the future, and
labor will suffer in the end.
The need for remedial legislation is evident. It has been suggested
by management that the Act be amended to exclude specifically from
the area of required collective bargaining certain subjects which have
traditionally been considered, because of their nature, within the ex-
clusive domain of management, e.g., health, welfare benefit, and stock
purchase plans.r9 The Act would thereby provide the Board with a
more definite framework or basis for deciding what is within or with-
out the scope of compulsory bargaining. Alternatively, the Board
should, on its own initiative, set up rules defining those areas where
management is free to act unilaterally without apprehension of inter-
ference or intrusion by labor through the Board's decisions.
USE OF A FOREIGN TRUST TO Avow THE NEW YORK RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Introduction
The purpose of the Rule against Perpetuities has been to preserve
'the alienability of property.' The Rule terminated an historic conflict
between the English landlords and the common-law courts. The land-
lords' desire to keep estates in the family line for as long as possible
was at cross purposes with the policy of the English courts, which
were by tradition in favor of freedom of alienation.2 Although the
with the advancement of working conditions and employee benefits without the
prodding of collective bargaining can no longer improve the lot of their em-
ployees without first bargaining with their union. This is not conductive to
further voluntary improvement of the employee's status because the employer
will have to await the union's demand because he knows that if he makes an
offer, the union will pyramid something on top of that offer so that they can
claim* credit for it. Employers, knowing this, will make no voluntary offers
and will'give way slowly to the-union demands and will'make every effort
short of having a strike to keep the benefits at the least possible level consis-
tent with the industry level. They cannot afford to volunteer any improvements
or grant any more benefits because if they make an offer of X amount, they
know the union will demand X plus." Id. at 10.
59 See Hearings before Committee on Education and Labor. of the House
of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1080-1082, 1100-1102, 2208, 3545-3546
(1953).
1 See GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 297 (4th ed. 1942) ; PowELL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 299 (1940).
2 See 7 HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 193-202 (2d ed. 1937);
CASNER AND LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 275 (1951).
1955]
